America's reputation for effectiveness. The victory was swift, but the occupation was chaotic. The insurgency appeared to take Washington by surprise, and no wonder: The Pentagon was squabbling with the State Department, the soldiers had no instructions and didn't speak the language. The overall impression, in Iraq and everywhere else, was of American incompetence—and, after Abu Ghraib, of stupidity and cruelty as well. Two years ago, a poll showed that vast numbers of our closest friends felt that the "mismanagement" of Iraq—not the "invasion" of Iraq—was the biggest stumbling block for allies of the United States.
No wonder, then, that America's ability to organize a coalition has also suffered. Participation in the Iraq war cost Tony Blair his reputation and the Spanish government an election. After an initial surge of support, the Iraqi occupation proved unpopular even in countries where America is popular, such as Italy and Poland. Almost no country that participated in the conflict derived any economic or diplomatic benefits from doing so. None received special U.S. favors—not even Georgia, which sent 2,000 soldiers and received precisely zero U.S. support during its military conflict with Russia.
It will be a lot harder to get any of the "coalition of the willing" to fight with us again. Indeed, "Iraq" is part of the reason why there is so little enthusiasm for Afghanistan and why it is so difficult to put organized pressure on Iran.
Another victim of the conflict was America's ability to influence the Middle East. Admittedly, we were never as good at this as we would like to be, but the chaos in Iraq has clearly strengthened Iran. It has had no positive impact on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By helping raise the price of oil for a few years—this was supposed to be a "war for oil"; remember that?—it has also strengthened Saudi Arabia, the regime that produced 15 of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers.
Of course, the high oil price also strengthened Russia and Venezuela—not that anyone has much noticed—because another casualty of the Iraq war has been America's ability to think like a global power. Even if we eventually pull out of Iraq altogether, we will have been bogged down in that country for the decade that also saw China's rise to real world-power status, Latin America's drift to the far left, and Russia's successful use of pipeline politics to divide Europe—all trends that commanded hardly any attention from the Bush administration and so far even less from Obama.
In the end, the jury is still out on this. We cannot leave Iraq anytime soon if we have any hopes of containing Iran. Already, the Iraqi Defense Minister is making statements that the US needs to maintain a presence in Iraq until at least 2016. It's still unclear whether Turkey, the one regional power that can counter Iran, would be willing to do so, with the Islamists gaining political power. Despite the grand bargain wishful thinking of the Obama administration, the Iranians have little reason to enter into comprehensive diplomatic negotiation with us, that is, unless they truly believe we will strike them. And not just their nuclear facilities--but take away their ability to project offensive power in the region, and cripple their hegemonic ambitions. But I simply don't believe it's in the President's DNA to launch a new war. An if they assess that as well, they just have to wait for our withdrawal out of both Iraq and Afghanistan.
If our diplomacy is adept enough though, a stable Iraq that is not betrothed to Iran, or permanently Lebanon-ized in sectarian factions, will be a remarkable force for political and cultural reform in the Middle East for decades. If the earlier outcomes prevail though, the whole project will have to be deemed a failure. Time will only tell.
No comments:
Post a Comment