No First Use of Nukes?

The big hub-bub over Obama's nuclear posture review is explained by the WaPo:

Under the new policy, the administration will foreswear the use of the deadly weapons against nonnuclear countries, officials said, in contrast to previous administrations, which indicated they might use nuclear arms against nonnuclear states in retaliation for a biological or chemical attack.

But Obama included a major caveat: The countries must be in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations under international treaties. That loophole would mean Iran would remain on the potential target list.

The new policy will also describe the purpose of U.S. weapons as being fundamentally for deterrence. Some Democratic legislators had urged Obama to go further and declare that the United States would not use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. But officials in the Defense and State departments worried that such a change could unnerve allies protected by the U.S. nuclear "umbrella."

Peter Feaver points out the loopholes in the new declaration. We can still reserve the right to use nukes against nuclear states that do meet the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (e.g. China and Russia), and against terrorist groups who chose to use weapons of mass destruction. There's even a loophole on the threat of a catastrophic bio or chem attack where the White House reserves the right to make adjustments in policy.

Obama's goal of a world without nuclear weapons is utopian. But he's not the first to articulate it--Ronald Reagan also wanted the abolishment of nuclear weapons.  Distinguished statesmen like former Secretary of States Shultz, Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, and Sam Nunn also endorse this goal. So why do these elder statesmen endorse a policy that amounts to closing the barn door after the horse has already bolted?

The recent push to abolish nuclear weapons is an effort to limit the value of their possession in an attempt to solve the proliferation issue for rogue states like North Korea and Iran, and perhaps even more importantly, keep them out of the hands of terrorist groups. While it's in our own national interests to cut stockpiles, ensure tight security of these weapons, and take other measures to combat proliferation, it can only mitigate the issue and never really solve it.  Nuclear weapons are a symptom of the greater cause of conflict (Hobbesian world). We must make it a national security priority to combat proliferation and in particular, avoid the possession of nuclear weapons in a region as volatile as the Middle East. But we cannot turn back the tide on the knowledge that already exists to make these weapons. I believe all these statesmen know this, but feel the steps that accompany such a policy would help make us more secure, even if the goal is never fully realized, which means in the end, we'll always retain some nuclear weapons for deterrence.  In the op-ed from these statesmen, there is no mention of a change to our strategic ambiguity policy. So while they endorse the administration's treaty proposals with the Russian in reducing our stockpiles, it'll be interesting in the days ahead to see if the pundits ask these men their thoughts on changes to strategic ambiguity. On the administration's policy, Feaver notes:

The administration clearly believes that announcing new limits on our nuclear posture will be a strong reason for rogue states to become compliant. This seems hopelessly idealistic: we’ve given Iran and North Korea plenty of stronger incentives, with no progress.

So it seems we've tabled some options for the security of our country, and traded some of our deterrence in hopes of achieving an unrealistic goal.  My own judgement is we should never take any option off the table when it comes to the security of the US. Obama hasn't declared a policy of no-first use yet, but this is designed to edge closer to that path. A policy of no-first use would be morally disastrous and irresponsible in that it erode our deterrent value greatly, and would theoretically, for example, allow a nuclear attack on NYC before even considering any type of nuclear response. Our allies would lose faith in the US security umbrella and would pursue more independent policies, weakening our most potent incentives.  Some may rearm, neutralizing the very effect we would hope such a policy would bring.

  Fred Kaplan usefully sums this up: 

At the same time, though, it's equally hard to see what we'd get from a policy of no-first-use, even if other countries' leaders believed the promise. 

The idea behind no-first-use is to "delegitimize" nuclear weapons—to announce to the world that the foremost nuclear power, the only nation that has ever dropped A-bombs in anger, has concluded that these things have no military utility, no place in wars of the present or the future. 

The problem is that history reveals they do have value, whatever we might belatedly say—not necessarily in their actual use but merely in their possession. They elevate one's standing in a region (see Pakistan); they deter others from attacking (see China in the mid-1960s or North Korea now); they can be brandished as a way of keeping others from responding to lower level forms of aggression. (If Saddam Hussein had built some nukesbefore invading Kuwait in 1990, it's doubtful that George H.W. Bush and James Baker could have amassed a large coalition to push him back.) 

Which leads to the fourth point: No matter what Washington says, or how deeply the United States or Russia or the other established nuclear powers cut their own nuclear arsenals, it will probably have minimal impact on other countries' decisions to go, or not to go, nuclear themselves. Their own interests will determine those decisions. In fact, one could argue that a U.S. pullback of this sort may make some technologically advanced countries—which have relied on America's "nuclear umbrella" for their security—to take the leap and build their own bombs. 

The true value of this Nuclear Posture Review depends, in part, on how President Obama views—and presents—its purpose. If he sees it as a way to build institutional support for drastic arms cuts, it could be very valuable indeed. If he sees it as a first step toward his grander goal of wiping nuclear weapons off the face of the earth, he's going to be sorely disappointed.